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Abstract 
This research is a quantitative causality study that analyzes the effect of fraud disclosure, internal control, 
information technology on corporate performance and corporate governance as moderating variables. The results 
of this study are expected to contribute to the existing literature by overcoming some of the limitations articulated 
from previous studies. First, it offers new empirical insights on company risk and disclosure of fraud by 
management by basing research in behavioral theories that emerge from the board of directors and corporate 
governance, where corporate decision making is not only assumed to be underlined by formal approaches and CG 
mechanisms, but also CG arrangements informal, limited rationality, political bargaining, routine and satisfying 
behavior. The fixed-effect regression model is used to study the relationship of fraud disclosure, internal control 
and information technology of financial performance while the random-effect regression model is used from non-
financial performance. Panel data of 192 sample observations from public companies in the banking sector which 
are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and are included in the Top 50 ASEAN Scorecard. The findings show 
the disclosure of fraud, internal control and information technology have a positive effect on company performance, 
both financial and non-financial performance and corporate governances strengthen the financial performance but 
weaken the non-financial performance 
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1. Introduction 
The progress of a country's economy can be measured in various ways one of which is capital market activity in 
the country. Indonesia's large and growing economy is a land for foreign investors to make a profit, especially 
through the capital market. Ideally, company performance as the biggest production factor depicts economic 
performance. 
The company's performance is the fruit of the results of several objects that become decisions of individuals 
continuously by the management concerned. An assessment of a company's financial performance can be done by 
analyzing its financial performance The financial performance report is used as a source of information for 
shareholders and the general public regarding the business activities of the company (Zhao et, al 2018). Both index 
performance and economic performance, we certainly hope that the Indonesian index performance is able to 
represent overall economic performance. 
The structure of CG influences a number of aspects of its business model, including setting company goals 
and how those objectives must be achieved, monitoring and assessing risk and optimizing performance. Minna 
(2011) found that analysts tend to provide favorable recommendations for companies with better CG mechanisms. 
It is also expected that CG increases corporate oversight of earnings and reduces management manipulation and 
increases the reliability of financial statements (Leuz et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 2002). Of course, a strong CG 
structure will provide a powerful monitoring tool for managerial decision making and limit activities that have an 
impact on company performance both in the use of company resources and with the implementation of information 
technology developed or adopted by the company.  
Research contributes to the existing literature by overcoming some of the limitations articulated from previous 
studies. First, it offers new empirical insights on company risk and disclosure of fraud by management by basing 
our research on behavioral theories that emerge from the board of directors and corporate governance, where 
corporate decision making is not only assumed to be underlined by formal approaches and CG mechanisms, but 
also CG arrangements informal, limited rationality, political bargaining, routine and satisfying behavior (Van Ees 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Agency Theory 
Basically, an agent will not give up before his personal interests are fulfilled (Kasum et al. 2011). To explain this, 
agency theory is well suited for use. Agency theory connects shareholders (principals) and management (agents) 
who have different interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Agency theory tries to explain that management has 
greater information related to company operations than shareholders. This imbalance of information causes 
conflict (Glover et al. 2006). 
 
2.2 Fraud Disclosure 
Fraud occurs when a misstatement is made in a situation that knows that it is a fake and is carried out with the 
intent to commit fraud. Arens and Loebbecke (1997). An act or process of fraud or concealment of deliberate 
neglect or deviation from the truth such as breaking the law and acting unfairly (Sorunke, et al., 2016). Acts or 
paths of fraud, deliberate concealment, negligence, or distortion of the truth, to (1) obtain unauthorized or unjust 
benefits, (2) encourage other parties to take part with valuables or surrender legal rights, or (3) give rise to injury 
in several ways. Deliberate fraud is a criminal offense that requires severe punishment, and prosecution and 
punishment (such as murder) are not bound by statute of limitations. But the inability or negligence in managing 
a business or even the wasteful disposal of company assets (by speculating on the stock market, for example) is 
usually not fraud. 
 
2.3 Internal Control 
Products that have been produced by COSO include Internal Control - Integrated Framework (1992) and Enterprise 
Risk Management - Integrated Framework (1994). Indonesia adopted Internal Control - Integrated Framework 
(1992) in Government Regulation No. 60/2008 concerning Government Internal Control Systems. In its 
development, COSO has released the latest IC framework, Internal Control - Integrated Framework (2013) to 
replace the old IC framework. 
 
2.4 Information Technology 
The value of IT business seems to have explained this relationship through what is called the IT capability 
perspective of supported organizations (Rai et al., 2006). From this perspective, IT has an indirect, not direct, 
impact on company performance through high-level process capabilities. Thus, IT plays a key role in shaping the 
capabilities of other organizations that create performance advantages for companies, such as developing dynamic 
new product development (NPD) capabilities and NPD functional competencies (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2006) and 
supply chain integration capabilities (Rai et al, 2006).  
 
2.5 Corporate Governances 
Cheng et al. (2014) explains that corporate governance is governance within a company that can direct and control 
the company. In a company, the function of directors is a corporate governance mechanism. In the concept of 
corporate governance, there are two important things that must be known. These two important things are the right 
of shareholders to obtain information and the obligation of company management to disclose accurately, timely, 
and transparent to all information related to company performance, ownership, and stakeholders (Kaihatu 2006). 
 
2.6 Hypotheses Development 
2.6.1 Disclosure of Fraud, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance. 
Agency theory connects shareholders (principals) and management (agents) who have different interests (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Our hypothesis is that corporate performance is an important driver of corporate fraud in 
accordance with Cressey's fraud triangle (Cressey, 1950, 1953). This research contributes to the literature on 
corporate fraud theory, which seeks to explain what motivates companies to commit fraud (Finnerty et al., 2016, 
Trompeter et al., 2013). 
H1. Disclosure of fraud has a positive effect on corporate performance. 
Saidi (2011) shows that corporate governance reforms in the developed capital market are often driven by investors, 
whereas in the GCC, the burden of improving corporate governance lies with regulators because of the ownership 
structure of the company (especially family or country) and the availability of liquidity and financing to form 
regional banks . 
H2. CG strengthens the disclosure relationship on corporate performance fraud. 
2.6.2 Internal Control, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
As a formal institutional arrangement, internal internal conductive to improve the quality of business decisions 
(D'Mello, Gao, & Jia, 2017), increase the efficiency of resource allocation (Cheng et al., 2013), improve corporate 
governance and reduce corporate risk taking ( Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter, 2010). As required by the Company's 
Internal Control Standards, internal control must focus on important business issues and high-risk areas under full 
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scale control, and then determine the company's risk response strategy. It also emphasizes the importance of 
recognizing internal and external risks in daily operations. 
H3. Internal control has a positive effect on corporate performance. 
The presence of the board of directors at the company is very important to monitor management decisions and 
ensure that they disclose credible voluntary information rather than self-serving according to Healy and Palepu 
(2001), helping provide some reference information for stakeholders and regulators to help improve financial 
statements. Therefore, there is a need to assess (measure) the disclosure of internal control information in these 
companies, so that they can be improved. 
H4. Corporate governance strengthens internal control relationships with corporate performance. 
2.6.3 Information Technology, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
The literature review starts with the most basic argument (i.e. IT capabilities affect company performance). 
Furthermore, based on the influence of time, the company's current and future performance must be distinguished. 
Thus, the lag effect and the ongoing effect of information technology can be explained. In short, IT capabilities 
simultaneously show good performance, future company performance, and corporate value (Ong and Chen, 2013) 
H5. Information technology has a positive effect on company performance. 
The role of corporate governance and IT in preventing and detecting fraud adds little research to this topic, 
especially in Asean and developing countries. There are significant consequences for companies due to lack of 
fraud prevention and detection practices. Therefore, the results of this study can provide more information to senior 
management and the company's board of directors, so that they are more aware of the importance of their 
supervisory function, ethical behavior, their own behavior and tone and effective corporate governance to avoid 
future companies. . failure (Halbouni and Garbou, 2016). 
H6. Corporate governance strengthens the relationship between information technology and company 
performance. 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Population dan Sample 
Population uses secondary financial statement data from public banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. This study uses non-random sampling technique, namely purposive sampling. The total banking 48 
companies, the observation period from 2015-2018 was 4 years so that 192 observations obtained. 
 
3.2 Research Model 
The method used for hypothesis testing in this study is the panel data method (pooled regression), using data 
analysis tools in the form of Eviews software. The quantitative method that will be used in this study is a dynamic 
causal econometric analysis by applying the least squares method to the fixed effect model or the random effect 
model. After that, a series of statistical tests are performed using the Chow Test and the Hausmann Test to get the 
optimal model to explain the results of this study. 
Hypothesis Equations: 
(i)  FP =  0 +  1 FD +  2 IC +  3 TI + e 
(ii) FP =  0 +  1 FD +  2 FD * CG +  3 IC +  4 IC * CG +   5 TI +  6 TI * CG + ε 
0  = Constant 
1- 6 = Cohesive regression 
FP  = Corporate Performance 
FD  = Fraud Disclosure 
IC  = Internal Control 
TI  = Information Technology 
CG  = Corporate Governance 
ε  = Error 
 
4. Result and Discussion  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1. descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. The natural logarithm value of the tenure of 
directors of directors (TEN) is 77.8 indicating that BOD generally has a relatively high BOD experience. Around 
19.3 BOD also served as an audit committee or corporate governance (AGC) and compensation or nomination 
committee (CNC). In terms of BOD strength, around 43.2 percent of CEOs simultaneously served as chairman of 
the board of directors (DUAL); Their share ownership is relatively high (SHARE average of 43.2 percent). In 
addition, most BOD adhered to attending board meetings (LOWATT) and quite high had many outside director 
positions (OUTB) (average LOWATT and OUTB were 0.010 and 0.438, respectively). 
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Table 1. descriptive statistics 
Variable No  Mean  Med Max. Min.  S.D 
Dependent Variable             
Financial Performance             
NIM 192 4,720 4,700 12,000 -11,570 2,331 
ROA 192 1,044 1,200 10,770 -11,150 2,282 
ROE 192 4,978 7,620 31,220 -94,010 17,894 
Non-Financial Performance             
CUST 192 1,708 2,000 3,000 1,000 0,586 
FIN 192 1,943 2,000 3,000 1,000 0,774 
IB 192 1,495 1,000 3,000 0,000 0,579 
IL 192 1,375 1,500 3,000 0,000 0,952 
Independent Variable             
Pengungkapan Kecurangan 192 3,661 4,000 5,000 0,000 1,401 
Internal Control 192 0,364 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,531 
Teknologi Informasi 192 0,234 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,233 
Moderate Variable 
Corporate Governances             
AGC 192 0,193 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,395 
DUAL 192 0,432 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,497 
LNTEN 192 0,778 1,099 1,609 0,000 0,605 
LOWATT 192 0,010 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,102 
OUTB 192 0,438 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,497 
SHARE 192 0,432 0,000 1,000 0,000 0,497 
 
4.2 Result & Discussion 
Table 2: The Effect of fraud disclosure, internal control, information technology and corporate governances on 
financial performance. 
 
Agency theory connects shareholders (principals) and management (agents) who have different interests 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), stakeholder theory suggests that if we adopt as an analysis unit the relationship 
between businesses and groups and individuals who can influence or be influenced by it then we have a better 
chance to deal effectively. Referring to table 2, the panel data regression results of the disclosure relationship 
between fraud (FD), internal control (IC) and information technology (IT) on the company's financial performance 
(FP): ROA, ROE and NIM show all have a positive relationship but only a significant ROA . These results indicate 
conformity with research conducted by Finnerty et al., (2016), Trompeter et al., (2013), Hogan et.al. (2008), 
Halbouni and Garbou (2016), Ong and Chen (2013) with the influence of 59.6% ROA, 54.3% ROE and 12.72% 
NIM. 
In table 2, the panel data regression results of the disclosure of fraud (FD), internal control (IC) and 
information technology (IT) relationships to the company's financial performance (FP) moderated by corporate 
governances (CG) show that corporate governances (CG) strengthen the relationship disclosure of fraud (FD), 
internal control (IC) and information technology (IT) on the company's financial performance (FP), especially 
ROA which looks significant. This is in accordance with research by Saidi (2011), Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter 
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(2010), Caroline Simorangkir, R. T. M., Solihati, G. P.,. M., & Subiyanto, B., (2019). 
So it was concluded that hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 6 was accepted to have an effect on the company's 
financial performance. The importance of disclosure of fraud (FD), internal control (IC) and information 
technology (IT) on the company's financial performance (FP) through ROA indicators is still considered reliable 
to ensure stakeholder satisfaction. And the influence of corporate governances is still visible. 
Table 3: The Effect of fraud disclosure, internal control, information technology and corporate governances on 
non- financial performance. 
 
The panel data regression results of the disclosure relationship cheating (FD), internal control (IC) and 
information technology (IT) on the company's non-financial performance (FP): FIN, COST, IB and IL in table 3 
show all have a positive relationship and only IL that does not significant with the influence of 8.42% FIN, 8.07% 
COST, 65.37% IB and 13.35% IL. 
In table 3, the panel data regression results of the disclosure of fraud (FD), internal control (IC) and 
information technology (IT) relationships on corporate financial performance (FP) moderated by corporate 
governances (CG) indicate that corporate governances (CG) weaken the relationship disclosure of fraud (FD), 
internal control (IC) and information technology (IT) on the company's non-financial performance (FP). So it was 
concluded that hypotheses 2, 4 and 5 were rejected. And corporate governances have no visible effect on non-
financial performance. 
 
5. Conclusions, Limitaitons and Suggestions  
5.1 Conclusions 
The structure of CG influences a number of aspects of its business model, including setting company goals and 
how those objectives must be achieved, monitoring and assessing risk and optimizing performance. Of course, a 
strong CG structure will provide a powerful monitoring tool for managerial decision making and limit activities 
that have an impact on company performance both in the use of company resources and with the implementation 
of information technology developed or adopted by the company. So it can be concluded, disclosure of fraud, 
internal control and information technology has a positive effect on company performance, both financial and non-
financial performance and corporate governances strengthen the financial performance but weaken the non-
financial performance. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions 
In this study, the sample data should comply with the presentation standards in the annual report in accordance 
with those regulated in Financial Services Authority Regulation No. 34 / POJK.04 / 2014. Many sample data that 
make revised financial statement data so that the data obtained is not consistent. For further research can include 
a larger sample of companies. For financial performance, you can see Tobin-Q measurement, besides that a 
comparison can be made for companies that have not yet entered the Top 50 Asean Scorecard. 
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